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Applying Restraints to Private Police
Heidi Boghosian*
Before he was convicted of bombing the federal building in Oklahoma
City, Timothy James McVeigh worked as a security guard with Bums Intema-
tional Security in upstate New York.' Even though he came to work one day
brandishing a sawed-off shotgun, he retained his job at Bums guarding Calspan
Corporation, a firm conducting "classified research in advanced aerospace
rocketry and electronic warfare" for the Defense Department.2 Calspan de-
scribed McVeigh as a "model employee," noting that his one "quirk ... was
that he couldn't deal with people" and would start "yelling at them" and could
be "set off easily."
3
Mr. McVeigh is not the only security guard who has problems dealing
with people. Although they perform a range of law enforcement-related activi-
ties, private security guards are frequently ill-trained, unsupervised, and may
themselves have criminal records. In a startling disclosure, the Chicago Hous-
ing Authority police chief estimated that 20 percent of guards working private
security at the Chicago Housing Authority in 1996 were active gang members.4
A man on probation for a misdemeanor robbery found employment as an ar-
mored-car guard where he worked for nearly two months before killing his
partner and stealing $300,000 while on the job.5
It is not surprising that security personnel frequently find themselves in
court accused of using excessive force and violating the constitutional rights of
others. The security industry partners with public police-and outnumbers pub-
lic police by three to one in the United States-in a range of law enforcement
activities that puts them in direct contact with the public. Yet security guards
are private actors and are not subject to the same constitutional strictures as
public police.6 They can stop, detain, and search individuals without probable
* Executive Director, National Lawyers Guild. B.A. Brown University, M.S.
Boston University, J.D. Temple University School of Law.
1. DAVID HOFFMAN, THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING AND THE POLITICS OF
TERROR 51 (1998).
2. Id.; Mike Zielinski, McVeigh on Guard, COVERT ACTION Q., Fall 1995, at
50.
3. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 51-52.
4. Gilbert Jimenez & Jorge Oclander, Gangs Infest CIA Security, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at Al.
5. Martha Irvine, Armored Guard Suspect Is Apprehended in Utah,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at A16.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1997) (Fourth
Amendment does not apply to shopping mall security guards in detaining and search-
ing store patron); People v. Brouillette, 258 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal. App. 1989) (shop-
ping mall security guards not asserting state authority in conducting search, thus ex-
clusionary rule did not apply); Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036 (Mass.
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cause and can sometimes turn over evidence obtained to local law enforcement.
In some private sector jobs, security officers may even arrest suspects and file
criminal charges in court. Such cooperation between private security personnel
and public police is becoming routine in the United States. Despite extensive,
costly litigation stemming from harmful encounters with security guards, the
industry remains virtually unregulated.
This Article argues that equitable remedies in the form of improved train-
ing and oversight for private police should be requested as part of relief in all
Section 1983 claims involving private police. Attempts at industry standardiza-
tion have failed in Congress and are virtually non-existent in the states, but such
measures would greatly benefit society by reducing the number of violent en-
counters between private security officers and the public, with a resulting de-
crease in costly litigation. Improved training would also benefit corporate secu-
rity firm employers by reducing both litigation expenses and industry costs
related to high attrition rates. The vast interrelationship between private security
and public law enforcement officials-even the extent to which private security
industry mimics public law enforcement through appearance and implied deri-
vation of authority-supports the creation of oversight mechanisms for pur-
poses of accountability and liability. In some instances, public law enforcement
agencies have become dependent upon the otherwise unconstitutional actions of
private security forces in efforts to control crime. Private security companies
have effectively become a special branch of the police, free to act without con-
stitutional restraint.
Part I of this Article reveals the dangers posed by the virtually unregulated
private security industry, and the litigation that has resulted. Part II looks at the
proliferation of the industry and some of the reasons public police forces in-
creasingly rely on private security forces to perform public police functions.
Part III addresses the origins and relationship of private security and a full-time
public force in the United States. Part IV discusses several government-funded
studies examining the role of private security in the United States and revealing
a trend toward greater cooperation between private security and public police
forces. It also argues that implied derivation of authority and intimidation by
appearance greatly confuse the public and make if difficult to distinguish be-
tween the private and public sectors. Part V examines the application of Section
1982) (security guards may search employee's belongings if conducted in reasonable
manner for protection of private employee's belongings or for protection of private
employer's property); State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1985) (Montana sides with
majority of states in ruling that private search not covered by exclusionary rule); Peo-
ple v. Ray, 480 N.E.2d 1065 (N.Y. 1985) (New York security officers do not have to
give Miranda warnings). But see Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc. 874 F.2d 555, 558-59 (8th
Cir. 1989) (nexus existed between state and merchant, a state actor); State v. Muegge,
360 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1987) (Miranda-like requirements apply to interrogation of
suspected shoplifter by security guard-state prohibition of unreasonable searches
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1983 custom and practice litigation in private police cases where the private
and public sectors work together in harming individuals. It urges litigators to
seek equitable relief, in addition to damages, in the form of improved training,
screening, and licensing.
I. PROBLEMS ENDEMIC TO THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY
High attrition rates, inadequate personnel screening and selection, sub-
standard training and supervision of personnel, low pay, and conflicts of inter-
ests plague the private security industry.7 Standardization aimed at improving
these areas has been slow to evolve, in part because it is perceived as a restraint
on business competition.
8
A. High Attrition Rates Plague Private Security Industry
High turnover is an ongoing and costly problem in the private security in-
dustry. Security guard firms in Los Angeles County, for example, average 400
percent turnover in a given year.
9
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, industry turnover was already
high, with 35 percent of the workforce having less than one year's experience.'
0
Such turnover increases the costs of hiring and training and also reduces safety,
given that inexperienced personnel perform the job less effectively and may
adapt less easily to new systems and job requirements than more highly trained
workers." These costs are shared by building owners, tenants, security contrac-
tors, and security officers.' 2 After September 11 th, turnover problems, com-
bined with inadequate and inconsistent training, low wages, and variation in
licensing across the states, have become even more pervasive.13
The General Accounting Office reports a rise in turnover rates among air-
port screeners.14 There was an average turnover rate of 126 percent at the nine-
7. WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE HALLCREST REPORT II: PRIVATE
SECURITY TRENDS 1970-2000, at 141-58 (1990). See also Mike Zielinski, Armed and
Dangerous: Private Police on the March, COVERT ACTION Q., Fall 1995, at 44, 48.
8. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7, at 150-52.
9. Karen Teitelman, Security Guard Firms-Statistical Data Included, L.A.
Bus. J., Mar. 5, 2001.
10. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, BUILDING A SECURITY
WORKFORCE FOR THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, available at http://www.seiu.org




14. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: LONG-
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teen largest airports in the United States from 1998-1999.5 Turnover among
airport screeners ranges from 37 percent in Honolulu to 416 percent in Saint
Louis 16 and is illustrative of an area that is especially vulnerable to national
security breaches as a result of such high attrition. In addition to the increased
costs this brings to training, it also reduces the incentive to provide all workers
with a thorough and extensive training program.' 7 High turnover has another
downside, potentially of incalculable cost to society: it makes it easier for ter-
rorists or their accomplices to obtain positions as airport security officers.' 8 The
President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism and The White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security concluded that perform-
ance could be enhanced by improving the selection, training and testing of air-
port screeners.19 And the 1999 National Research Council found that the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration should improve training and qualification proce-
dures for airport screeners who operate equipment.
20
B. Deficient Screening and Selection Processes for Security Officers
There are no federal guidelines governing the private security industry. In
1993, Representative Martinez introduced the Private Security Officers Quality
Assurance Act that would have directed the Attorney General to create a fin-
gerprint checking system to determine if prospective employees have criminal
records prior to hire.2 1 The House of Representatives twice passed the Act,
22
once by a vote of 415-6, but it stalled in the Senate after objections from the
Fraternal Order of Police.23 The 2001 version of the Act would have established
an expedited process for obtaining criminal background checks for prospective
security personnel through the FBI.2 4 The Judiciary Committee approved the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 25 tbl. 2.
17. See generally AvIATION SECURITY, supra note 14.
18. See generally id.
19. Id. at 26.
20. Id.
21. H.R. 1534, 103d Cong. (1993).
22. The 104th Congress passed the bill by a vote of 415-6. H.R. 2092, 104th
Congress (1996); 142 CONG. REC. H 11245 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996). The 105th Con-
gress passed HR 103 by a voice vote. H.R. 103, 105th Congress (1997); 143 CONG.
REC. H5857 (daily ed. July 28, 1997).
23. Gail M. Simonton, Embracing Officer Authorization, ACCESS CONTROL &
SECURITY SYS. INTEGRATION, May 1, 1998, available at http://securitysolutions.com/
mag/securityembracingofficer authorization.
24. Fact Sheet Issued by Congressman Barr's Office, The Private Officer Quality
Assurance Act of 2001, available at http://www.house.gov/burton/RSC/word/Barr7.doc
(last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
[Vol. 70
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legislation as an amendment to the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act; however, the
language pertaining to the private security industry was later removed.25
Regulations vary widely in most states in the areas of licensing, back-
ground checks, and training of security company personnel. Even though up to
90 percent of private security employees are unarmed, they are placed in posi-
tions of authority, giving the public a legitimate expectation that they are prop-
erly screened, hired, trained, and supervised. 26 Appropriate screening of pro-
spective employees is virtually impossible, however, since private security
firms cannot access the National Criminal Information Center. Most security
companies are only able to c6nduct statewide criminal checks, so criminal re-
cords in other states do not show up. In 1996, nearly two thousand guard li-
censes were revoked, suspended, or denied on the basis of criminal behavior in
California, where 164,000 licensed guards and thousands more unlicensed
guards work.27
Some states have enacted legislation creating training standards. In 2002,
Michigan passed SB 425,28 requiring private security guards to have a high
school diploma or its equivalent and to be at least 18 years of age, younger than
the previous requirement of 25 years of age.29 Under the statute, guards will
have to pay more for a state license.30 Companies licensed under the new laws
must fingerprint prospective personnel and cannot hire applicants who have
been convicted of a misdemeanor involving fraud or carrying an illegal firearm
or who have had two or more alcohol-related offenses.31 However, the legisla-
ture defeated measures that would have created a Security Provider Advisory
Commission to develop training standards.32 The commission would have had
six months to present the recommendations to the Department of State Police,
which would then have had a month to implement them.33 Michigan's legisla-
tive efforts were in part the result of several incidents arising out of encounters
with private security guards over minor offenses. 34 While other states and na-
tional security industry associations have attempted to establish standards, no
industry-wide standards have been established.
25. Id.
26. INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER SELECTION,
TRAINING AND LICENSING GUIDELINES 4 (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/privatesecurityofficer/2Epdf.
27. Geoff Boucher, Who's Keeping an Eye on the Security Guards?, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1997, at Al.
28. S. 425, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 338.1051-1088 (2004)).
29. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANI'. § 338.1067.
30. Id. § 338.1059.
31. Id. § 338.1060.
32. S. 420, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002).
33. Id.
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In California, the state screening process can take 120 days or more, and
only California crime records are checked, allowing out-of-state felons to avoid
detection.35 Legislation mandating training and background checks and at-
tempting to improve the speed of background checks has failed.36 Given that
FBI checks can take up to eighteen months to complete, many security compa-
nies rely on application forms and interviews and employ unlicensed guards
because it is less expensive to do so. 3 7 Penalties for employing unlicensed
guards may be so low that they do not serve as a deterrent.
38
C. Woefully Inadequate Training and Supervision in the Private Sector
Training is usually minimal for security personnel. The average uni-
formed security guard receives approximately four to six hours of pre-
assignment training.39 Only twenty-one states require training for unarmed
security guards and only twenty-eight require guards to be licensed.41 Califor-
nia has the highest standards for training-in 2002 it increased state training
requirements from three to forty hours. 41 San Diego security consultant John
Christman attributes the paucity of training and the low wages to the fact that
security guard companies do not attract high-quality candidates.42 Companies
do not invest in training when "[tihey get a lot of guys from walk-ins and ads"
35. Boucher, supra note 27.
36. Bill Number AB 2312 was introduced by Assembly Member Morrissey on
February 19, 1998:
Section 7583.9 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:
7583.9. (a) Within three working days after employment, any employee
who performs the function of a security guard or security patrolperson
who is not currently registered with the bureau, shall submit to the bureau
a completed application for registration on a form ....
A.B. 2312, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
37. Boucher, supra note 27. In California, standard wages range from $6-10 per
hour for licensed guards, while unlicensed earn about $4-5. Id. College campus secu-
rity proves an exception, according to a U.S. Justice Department study, which found
that 98 percent of agencies with sworn police officers ran criminal record checks of
applicants, and that 80 percent of agencies employing non-sworn officers conducted
background checks. BRIAN A. REAVES & ANDREW L. GOLDBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 1995 (1996).
38. In California, for example, the penalty for employing unlicensed guards is
only $12 under state law. Boucher, supra note 27.
39. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7, at 148.
40. Mimi Hall, Private Security Guards: Homeland Defense's Weak Link, USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, at Al.
41. Press Release, Service Employees International Union, Security Officers
Win Major Training Increase to Protect Building Tenants, Public (Sept. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.seiu.org/media/press.cfm?id = 1070.
42. Scott Winokur, Security Guards' Abuses Alarming, Experts Say, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 29, 2003, at Al.
[Vol. 70
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who may not stay longer than a few weeks on the job.4 3 "They don't know
anything and they're out there with a badge."" Training can consist of as little
as a video presentation and short quiz, followed by uniform fitting. Some new
employees receive no pre-assignment training and are trained on the job.45 The
usual subjects covered during training, if it does occur, include investigation
procedures and legal powers, report writing, fire prevention and protection, and
46building safety. Manuals, lectures, and visual aids are the usual methods of
training. 7 Nationally, there has been an increase in the numbers and kinds of
academic programs for security management positions, with the number of
certificate and degree programs increasing greatly.4 8 However, no vocational
programs exist for guards-who deal directly with the public-and whose
compensation is often just slightly higher than minimum wage.
Training is not even required for armed guards in twenty-seven states.49
On the average, firearms training for armed personnel usually does not exceed
eight hours. 50 Although many security personnel have had prior firearms train-
ing, especially if they are law enforcement officials working part-time in the
private sector, a great deal of firearms training focuses solely on the mechanical
aspects of weapon safety and firing a gun, but does not deal with real-life situa-
tions that might be encountered on assignment. 51 In addition, nearly half of
armed security personnel have had sports or recreational firearms experience
but no experience in the kinds of real-life situations confronted by private secu-
rity jobs.52
In July 2003, California's Bay Area joined Chicago as the only metropoli-
tan areas in the country to approve contracts covering private security offi-
cers.53 Members of SEIU Local 24/7 approved a four-year contract, covering
over three thousand security personnel in the Bay area, that calls for the crea-
tion of a new training program to greatly improve officers' ability to respond to
emergencies and conduct other activities. 54 The contract improves wages and
benefits by an average of 24 percent and provides for full employer-paid health
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7, at 148.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 150.
49. Id. at 147.
50. Id. at 144.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Press Release, Service Employees International Union, Historic Contract
Paves Way for Improved Security in Bay Area Office Buildings (July 17, 2003),




Boghosian: Boghosian: Applying Restraints to Private Police
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
insurance. 55 In conjunction with the contract, SEIU Local 24/7 conducted a
comprehensive advertising campaign aimed at educating the public about the
56importance of having properly trained security guards.
D. Low Salaries Sully the Industry
The median annual income in 2002 for security guards was $19,140. 57
The middle 50 percent earned between $15,910 and $23,920; the lowest 10
percent earned under $13,740, and the highest 10 percent earned over
$31,540.58 The federal government pays slightly higher. In 2001, new hires'
salaries ranged from $21,950 to $27,190 annually, depending on experience.
59
Guards employed by the government earned an average of $28,960 annually in
2001.60 They generally receive overtime pay for second and third shifts.
61
In contrast, the median yearly income in 2002 for police and sheriff's pa-
trol officers is over twice that of security personnel, at $42,270.62 The middle
50 percent earned between $32,300 and $53,500; the lowest 10 percent earned
under $25,270, and the highest 10 percent earned over $65,330.63 Median an-
nual earnings were $47,090 in state government, $42,020 in local government,
and $41,600 in federal government.64 That same year the median annual in-
come for supervisors of police and detectives was $61,010.65 Median annual
income was $78,230 in federal government, $59,830 for local government, and
$64,410 for state government.66
In an extreme example of exploitation, a job training program in New
York called "Pathways to Employment," developed by two Business Improve-
55. Id. The security companies involved are Pinkerton, Bums, ABM, ProTech,
Sentinel Guard Systems, Universal Protection Service, Barton Protective Services and
Ligouri Associates. Id.
56. Id.
57. Security Guards and Gaming Surveillance Officers, in BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2004-05
EDITION, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos 159.htm.
58. Id.
59. Security Guards and Gaming Surveillance Officers, in BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2002-03




62. Police and Detectives, in Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
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ment Districts, the Grand Central Partnership and 34th Street Partnership, em-
ployed homeless adults as security guards and contracted them out to outside
businesses.67 The program paid as little as $1 an hour at annual events in 1993
and 1994.68 In 1994, over one hundred participants in the Grand Central Part-
nership sued in federal court for violation of state and federal minimum wage
laws.
69
II. TROUBLESOME CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Over eighty percent of police departments permit public police to
moonlight in private security. This creates a conflict of interest for police offi-
cers about which laws to enforce-those of the private organization or those of
the police department. Not surprisingly, liability issues related to moonlighting
have spawned tort actions and raised conflict of interest issues. If a police offi-
cer sees a crime in progress while on detail work, he may be required by statute
to abandon his detail and respond to the crime. 70 As sworn officers of the
peace, police officers are bound to uphold certain laws such as forbidding mi-
nors from drinking or imposing occupancy limits on businesses that may inter-
fere with their private employer's business objectives.71
Another problem of having uniformed officers on private detail is that it
gives the appearance that the officers are on duty and available to assist the
general public. 72 It is also unclear who should pay sick leave or disability if a
police officer is wounded or seriously injured while working a security detail
and forced to retire. The city of Phoenix, Arizona, was ordered by the court to
pay death benefits to a moonlighting police officer killed by a robbery suspect
even though the officer was being paid for detail work by the motel when he
was killed.73 In Traver v. Meshriy,74 an off-duty officer moonlighting as a secu-
rity teller and involved at an incident at a bank was found to be acting under
color of law for Section 1983 purposes. 75
67. Archie v. Grand Cent. P'ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
68. Id. at 513. Pay ranged from $40-60 a week. Id.
69. Heather Barr, More Like Disneyland: State Action, 42 US.C. § 1983, and
Business Improvement Districts in New York, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 393, 399
(1997).
70. Suzy Spencer, Private Security, ON PATROL (Winter 1996-1997), available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20011006061909/www.onpatrol.com/cs.privsec.html.
71. Laura Stuchinsky, Security Matters, METRO (May 2, 1996), available at
www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/05.02.96/rentacop-9618.html.
72. Id.
73. City of Phoenix v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 742 P.2d 825 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987).
74. 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 938.
2005]
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Responsibility varies by state in lawsuits resulting from an officer's ac-
tions while on private detail. The city of Birmingham, Alabama, was found
liable for over $1.5 million when a minor was killed outside a bar where an off-
duty officer was on private detail. 76 The officer, in full uniform, equipped with
police paraphernalia, escorted several minors outside after an altercation
erupted.77 He then returned inside the bar, after which one of the youths was
beaten by the others and run over by a car.78 The court found that the officer
should have taken further steps to protect the minor and that, although off duty,
he was an agent of the city and was acting within the scope of his duty.
79
A. Implied Derivation ofAuthority
Benefits Private Police and Confuses Public
Private security employers who hire moonlighting public police benefit
from the fact that those officers often wear official public police uniforms and
paraphernalia and may even drive public police vehicles. Public police benefit,
in turn, from having a private arm that reports crimes, that may detain and
search citizens, and that may even testify in court, admitting evidence that
might otherwise be excluded had it been subject to the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment.
However, these mutual benefits also present a host of conflicts of interest
and increase the chance of litigation when police officers moonlight on private
detail. The sharing of public resources, such as uniforms and police vehicles,
confuses the general public about the authority these officers can exercise.
Wholly private security further confuses the general public regarding the
distinction between public and private police. Private police dress and act like
public law enforcement: by mimicking appearance and demeanor they imply
that they are acting with state authority. They benefit from this borrowed le-
gitimacy--the implication that they have state authority-and the public's fre-
quent mistake that they are indeed public police. Because the private sector
frequently works by contract for the government and in cooperation with law
enforcement, and because private police benefit from the public's perception of
their state authority, employers of private security personnel should be held
liable for excessive use of force and infringements on constitutional rights, and
the courts should mandate improved training of personnel.
76. City of Birmingham v. Benson, 631 So. 2d 902 (Ala. 1993).
77. Id. at 903.
78. Id.
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B. Special Police Officer Status Adds to Confusion
A few states, such as North Carolina, have enacted laws giving the attor-
ney general the authority to certify an agency-in North Carolina it is the
Metro Special Police & Security Services, Inc.-as a company police agency,
"commissioning" individuals as company officers. The North Carolina act
creates three categories--campus police officers, railroad police officers, and
special police officers.81 They have the same legal arrest authority as municipal
officers but must be assigned and contracted to a specific piece of real prop-
erty.8 2 Company police officers are allowed to use sirens and blue lights on
vehicles used while performing their duties, but only within their territorial
jurisdiction.83 In North Carolina, special police officers are trained to carry
firearms and, depending on the assignment, may carry the weapon openly if
wearing a police uniform or concealed if in plain clothes; they also carry Oleum
Capsicum spray and wooden batons. 84 They receive annual firearms training
from training officers and may attend in-service trainings through state certified
police training academies.
85
Special police in North Carolina must meet the same pre-employment
training standards as those required for state law enforcement officers.86 They
complete a twenty-six week introduction to basic law enforcement, firearms,
and other police related courses. 8 7 Background investigations are forwarded "to
the North Carolina Department of Justice Training and Standards for final re-
view and approval of the employment of that officer."
88
C. Litigation Resulting from Industry-wide Problems
The problems in the private security industry have resulted in an explo-
sion of litigation. Corporate employers who do not conduct thorough back-
ground checks or provide training and supervision to employees risk costly
lawsuits alleging, inter alia, negligent pre-employment investigation, training,
80. The Company Police Program was established by the North Carolina General
Assembly. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 74E-1 to -13 (2003); see also Metro Special Police &
Security Services, Inc., About Metro, available at http://www.metrospecialpolice.com
/about.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74E-6(b).
82. Id. § 74E-6(c).
83. Metro Special Police & Security Services, Inc., FAQ, available at
http://www.metrospecialpolice.com/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74E-8.
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and supervision.89 In several states, security officers may be granted full police
power by licensing them as "special police." 90 With these powers, security
guards can make arrests that private citizens cannot, including certain misde-
meanors and felonies based on probable cause.9' Ordinary citizens usually can
only arrest someone who they have witnessed commit a felony. 92 When li-
censed with police powers, private employers may make a higher number of
unwarranted arrests and thus may face a greater risk of civil liability.
93
In July 2003, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit alleging abuse by secu-
rity guards at an apartment complex could proceed as a class action. 94 The class
included all Hispanic non-Caucasian persons who had resided, were residing,
or would reside at an apartment complex in Nashville, Tennessee.9 5 The suit,
filed against Security Express Protective Services and the apartment's man-
agement companies, alleges the targeted harassment and intimidation of His-
panic residents.96 The suit also alleges that the apartment complex's manage-
ment companies failed to supervise the companies they hired for security to
ensure that they were not harassing residents.
97
The state of New York filed a lawsuit in 2002 against International Pro-
tective Services, Inc., for failure to properly screen its security guards. 98 Many
of the agency's personnel had criminal convictions yet were charged with
guarding state facilities, including the military installation Camp Smith, which
houses arms and munitions. 99 The company failed to conduct reference or
credit checks and failed to conduct mandatory drug testing for more than half of
the guards working under contract.' 00 Guards working at New York City home-
less shelters were not registered with the Department of State as required by
89. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Southwest Sec. & Prot. Agency, 665 P.2d 810 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1983) ($15,000 awarded against security company who negligently hired
and trained guards who beat spectator); 30 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 416-17 (Nov. 1987) (re-
porting Niakeen v. Hettig & Co., No. 86-02294 (Harris County Dist. Ct., Tex. filed
July 8, 1987)); 30 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 272 (Aug. 1987) (reporting Potucek v. Zody's
Dep't Store, No. C302021 (Los Angeles Superior Ct., Cal., filed Mar. 5, 1987)).
90. CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, PRIVATE SECURITY IN AMERICA 97-98 (1998).
91. Id. at 98.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 100.
94. Press Release, Tennessee Fair Housing Council, Court Grants Class-action





98. Press Release, Office of the State of New York Attorney General, State Acts
in Security Guard Scandal: Coordinated Legal and Administrative Action Seeks to
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New York law.' 0' Word of the misconduct was brought to the attention of the
New York State Attorney General after an audit by the State Comptroller of a
$956,000 contract uncovered information that a majority of the guards protect-
ing state facilities did not meet screening and training requirements.'
0 2
In Abraham v. Raso,10 3 an off-duty police officer moonlighting as a mall
security guard responded to a call for assistance from two Macy's security offi-
cers in the same mall after two shoplifters took large amounts of merchan-
dise.104 Kimberly Raso, the off-duty police officer, ordered one of the shoplift-
ers to stop and drew her weapon. 10 5 Raso fired a shot into the side window as
the shoplifter continued to drive away.'0 6 The shoplifter collided with another
car and hit a tree before he died. 10 7 His widow filed a suit and prevailed, with
the court finding that Raso acted under color of state law.108 She had worn her
municipal police uniform, identified herself as a police officer to the shoplifter,
and responded to a call for help from off-duty police officers working mall
security.
109
The discretion afforded private security guards has resulted in a spate of
legal cases, ranging from excessive force claims to claims of "consumer ra-
cism" against minority shoppers by private security guards in retail stores.' 10 In
a well-publicized case, a federal jury found that a security guard employed by
the chain store Eddie Bauer falsely imprisoned and demeaned three young Af-
rican American men when one entered the store wearing a shirt he had pur-
chased there the previous day."' The security guard asked the young man to
remove his shirt and leave when he could not produce a receipt, detained his
two friends, and ignored the store cashier's verification that the young man had
purchased the shirt from her. 112 The court ordered Eddie Bauer to pay $1 mil-
lion in civil damages." 
3
In 1992, Wells Fargo paid $3.7 million to customers who had been robbed
in thefts linked to Fargo guards.' 14 A $300,000 settlement was reached in one
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id. at 284.
106. Id. at 290.
107. Id. at 286.
108. Id. at 287.
109. Abraham v. Raso, 15 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442-43 (D. N.J. 1998), rev'd in part
and vacated in part by 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999).
110. Philip P. Pan, More Blacks Suing Over Retail Bias, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
1997, at AOl.
111. David Stout, 3 Blacks Win $1 Million in Bauer Store Incident, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1997, at A16.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Zielinski, supra note 7, at 48.
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case in which the employer allegedly failed to conduct a pre-employment in-
vestigation on an apartment security guard who beat a visitor. 1 5 In another
case, a security guard pleaded guilty to stealing sixteen television sets from
NBC at the 1996 Republican Convention.116
In San Jose, nightclubs' city-issued entertainment permits mandate that
clubs hire either uniformed off-duty police officers or state-registered security
guards. 1 7 Most of the complaints alleging excessive force were brought against
moonlighting officers. 18 Roughly half of the San Jose police department
moonlights-higher than the average of 20 percent in most departments. 119 And
off-duty officers wear their police uniforms while on security detail. 2 ' Al-
though businesses in the downtown area like having the extra police stationed
in the area on weekends as an added deterrent, having officers on guard has not
been without incident. 121 A 21-year-old man was killed in a brawl outside a
local nightclub even though seven off-duty officers were stationed outside. 122
Yet, depending on the jurisdiction, police officers on detail work may not
act under "color of their authority" while working for a private employer de-
spite being vested with 24-hour police authority by law. They must act within
the scope of the employment agreement and work to further the interests of123
their part-time employer. Despite this mandate not to act under color of au-
thority, about three fourths of police departments nationwide permit officers to
wear police uniforms while on private detail, and many others also allow them
to use radios and police vehicles. 124 In cases in which private security guards
115. 30 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 416-17 (Nov. 1987) (reporting Niakeen v. Hettig & Co.,
No. 86-02294 (Harris County Dist. Ct., Tex., filed July 8, 1987)).
116. Del Jones & Ellen Neuborne, False Sense of Security, USA TODAY, Sept. 12,
1996, at lB.





122. Id. An independent police auditor, Teresa Guerrero-Daley, studied the San
Jose Police Department's off-duty policy. Id. The office opened in 1993 and fields
complaints of police misconduct. Id.
123. Id.
124. The New York Police Department introduced a plan in 1998, still in effect, to
allow officers to perform off-duty private security work in police uniform. New York
Police Dep't, Paid Detail Unit, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/misc/paid deta
il.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). The Police Department's "Paid Detail Unit" coor-
dinates the work, maintaining a list of nearly 160 businesses seeking to hire off-duty
officers. Id. Prospective employers must provide a certificate of insurance and the
police department conducts a credit and background check before assigning officers.
Id. The officers retain their full law enforcement authority. Id. Should an arrest situa-
tion arise, they are expected to call a supervisor. Id. Arrests for minor infractions are
usually assigned to an on-duty officer while more serious infractions may call for the
paid detail officer to process the arrest on public police overtime. Id.
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are police officers on private detail, some courts have imposed Fourth Amend-
ment limitations.' 25
III. PROLIFERATION OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY
Government expenditures on private security services in the United States
are more than double the amount spent on public law enforcement-a stagger-
ing $100 billion compared to law enforcement's $45 billion. 126 The private
security industry virtually exploded in the 1990s, when private security expen-
ditures grew to approximately $52 billion as compared to law-enforcement
expenditures of $30 billion."' From 1964 to 1992 the number of security or-
ganizations grew by over 800 percent with employment in these groups increas-
ing by nearly 925 percent. 128 Currently, private security companies employ
approximately two million guards, compared to public law enforcement's
725,000. 29 Reasons for this growth include increased perception by the public
of growth in workplace-related crimes (even though crime rates are actually
declining), limited fiscal resources for public protection, and a lack of satisfac-
tion with public policing as a deterrent.
130
It is helpful to understand the forces that have led to privatization. Propo-
nents of the privatization of criminal justice services cite two main benefits:
reduced costs and enhanced quality of services. A third claimed benefit is that
privatizing certain police services frees up public police to spend more time
fighting violent crime.' 3 1 The state increasingly relies on the privatization of
law enforcement efforts by contracting with private security companies or al-
lowing them to augment police forces, all without the constitutional strictures
adhered to by public police. Supplementary security forces provide an addi-
tional benefit to the state by creating a private arm to seize evidence that can be
passed on to public police for use in criminal prosecutions.
125. Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036 (Mass. 1982). See also Paul G.
Reiter, Annotation 36 A.L.R. 3d 553, 567-71 (2005) (addressing private security
guard issues).
126. William C. Cunningham, U.S. Private Security Trends, Address at Law
Commission of Canada's "In Search of Security" Conference (Feb. 2003), available
at http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/ress/conf/conf flyer/speakers abstract/cunningham.asp.
127. Zielinski, supra note 7, at 15.
128. Bruce L. Benson, The Independent Institute, The Countervailing Trend to
FBI Failure: A Return to Privatized Police Services (May 29, 2001), available at
http://www.independent.aristotle.net/newsroom/article.asp?id=389.
129. Cunningham, supra note 126.
130. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7.
131. Adrian T. Moore, Private Services Expand Police Effectiveness,
PRIVATIZATION WATCH (Reason Pub. Policy Inst.), Sept. 1996, at I.
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A. Initial Cost Effectiveness in Privatizing Some Police Functions
The high costs associated with the government's handling of many crimi-
nal justice-related services have resulted in privatizing such services, most no-
tably in the area of penal institutions. Overcrowding, poor conditions and prac-
tices, high turnover among personnel, and the increased costs of providing cor-
rectional services are some of the conditions that created a trend toward privati-
zation in the prison industry.132 While the cost-effectiveness of contract polic-
ing has not been formally evaluated, corrections services have been the subject
of independent evaluations. These studies conclude that privatization could
yield savings of approximately "20 percent in construction costs and from 5 to
15 percent [savings] in [the] private management of prison units." 133 Tom
Beasley, vice-president of Corrections Corporation of America, stresses that
private industry gets better prices from contractors than the government does
since contractors traditionally charge the government more. 134
The National Institute of Justice, in a report on corrections and the private
sector, highlighted five areas in which private sector facilities may be effective:
(1) rapid mobilization (to quickly bring additional facilities and person power);
(2) experimentation (testing new models without committing to permanent
changes); (3) decentralization (allowing for greater geographic and program
diversity); (4) specialization (flexibility to satisfy unique needs); and (5) re-
gionalization (not being bound by jurisdictional politics in trying to create
shared facilities among states or counties). 135
The ability of private industry to be more flexible in providing services
than government is also cited as a considerable factor in cost savings. One re-
searcher suggests that lack of community satisfaction with governmental crime
control stems in part from the failure of government agencies to respond
quickly to changing demands, which is attributable in part to the "'political and
132. SIMONSEN, supra note 90, at 105.
133. BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND
COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28 (1998) (citing CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE
PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1990); CHARLES H. LOGAN & BILL W. MCGRIFF,
COMPARING COSTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS: A CASE STUDY (1989);
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds, 1993); Sam-
uel J. Brakel, Private Collections, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE
SYSTEM 254, 257-61 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992); 2 JOHN SHARP, BREAKING
THE MOLD: NEW WAYS TO GOVERN TEXAS (1991); WILLIAM G. ARCHAMBEAULT &
DONALD R. DEIS, JR., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS OF
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PRISONS IN LOUISIANA (1996)). But see Jennifer S. Light,
The Effects of Privatization on Public Services: A Historical Evaluation Approach, in
EVALUATION FINDINGS THAT SURPRISE 25 (Am. Evaluation Ass'n, New Directions for
Evaluation No. 90, 2001).
134. BENSON, supra note 133, at 30 (citing Kevin Krajick, Private, For-Profit
Prisons Take Hold in Some States, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 11, 1984, at 24).
135. SIMONSEN, supra note 90, at 105.
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organizational inflexibility"' of local government.'36 In Florida, for example,
the City of St. Petersburg contracted with a private firm to add security person-
nel in response to increased vandalism in public recreational and park areas,
rather than increasing the number of public law enforcement officials. 137 Con-
tracting with a private firm was less expensive and could be terminated when
the need lessened, a far more flexible alternative than trying to reduce the num-
ber of public police officers.
1 38
Private agencies can also save enormous amounts on labor costs. Private
industry is not subject to civil service rules and can hire nonunion labor.'
39
Also, private industry can elect to employ a smaller staff than government
might employ for the same job.14
0
Finally, the profit motive may encourage private firms to be innovative in
providing services. 141 Competition from other private firms for frequently re-
newing contracts motivates firms to cut costs and to enhance quality at the
same time. 142 Public sector providers, such as police chiefs, are not concerned
with profit and may thus be less motivated to monitor employees and curtail
wasted resources.143
B. Privatization Proponents Cite Better Quality for Some Functions
Contracts with private security agencies for certain police support tasks
and for some functions traditionally performed by police suggests improvement
of quality. A contract to investigate and recover bad checks in Kentwood,
Michigan, for example, exceeded the national bad check recovery rate by a
range of 12-37 percent in its first year. 144 On the other hand, private attorneys
contracted to serve as public defenders may have incentive to dispense with
cases quickly and may encourage plea bargains without fully apprising the
defendant of other options or the probability of success at trial. 1
45
Advances in technology for electronic detection equipment add to the ap-
peal of private security. The security industry provides a wide range of effec-
tive, cost-efficient technologies and integrated systems including assessment
and surveillance, intrusion detection, access control, personal identification
numbers, smart cards, and video comparator systems. 146 Moreover, the equip-
136. BENSON, supra note 133, at 31 (citation omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 30.
140. Id. at 30-31.
141. Id. at 32.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 38.
145. Id. at 39.
146. SIMONSEN, supra note 90, at 326-3 1.
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ment requires trained and qualified personnel to manage it, and private agencies
are considered better equipped to handle these tasks.
147
Because the private sector can specialize, proponents argue that more is
produced with the same resources. A police department in Amarillo, Texas
contracted with Allstate Security to respond to alarms.' 48 It was estimated that
approximately 3,420 hours were saved annually, roughly the equivalent of add-
ing 1.75 employees a year to the police department.149 In addition, rather than
having taxpayers pay for the cost of having the police respond, the cost is
shifted to those individuals benefiting from the alarm services.1 50 The benefits
of specialization are to provide a deterrent effect in the specified geographical
area that is protected by the security company. 151
Researchers evaluated a large private security system in Starrett City, in
the East New York section of Brooklyn, consisting of fifty-six residential build-
ings with 5,881 apartments.152 The majority of survey respondents, nearly 90
percent, felt safe within Starrett City while only 41 percent felt safe outside of
Starrett City. 53 The report concluded that Starrett City could be considered one
of the safest communities in the country.' 54 Nearly 80 percent of Starrett resi-
dents who responded to the survey said they would report an assault to the pri-
vate security force, while only about 13 percent would call the New York City
Police Department.1
55
Arguments against privatization, on the other hand, are many. Short-term
cost-cutting does not necessarily result in long-term savings. A coalition of
seventy-three labors unions, employee coalitions, and non-profit organizations,
including the AFL-CIO, AFSCME, the American Federation of Government
Employees, and the National Resources Defense Council, called on Congress in
late 2003 to stop the Bush Administration's plans for greater privatization of
government services. 56 John Gage, president of the American Federation of
Government Employees, representing about six hundred thousand federal
workers, says that contracting out does not save money and prevents the
American people from having a say in the way government is run.' 57 The UAW
147. BENSON, supra note 133, at 174.




152. Id. at 153-56. The researchers used records of the New York Police Depart-
ment, records of the Starrett City Security Unit, and questionnaires and interviews. Id.
153. Id. at 154.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Press Release, The American Federation of Government Employees, Broad
Coalition Calls on Bush Administration to Halt Plans to Privatize Government Ser-
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and other unions are vehemently against privatization of functions delivered in
the public interest and cite several problems of contracting out. Low-ball bids
by vendors may understate the long-term costs. When the city of Albany, New
York, outsourced maintenance of city vehicles, expecting to save thousands of
dollars annually, it ended up overspending by 20 percent, not including the
expenses of contract auditing and supervising.' 58 Privatization results in the
replacement of higher paying union jobs with low paying positions without
benefits. Communities lose public sector jobs, and local businesses that once
provided equipment and supplies are no longer used. 159
C. Freeing the Public Police to Focus on Violent Crime
The functions of public police fall into two broad categories. The first in-
cludes law enforcement, maintaining public order, patrol duty, and traffic en-
forcement. The second often consumes up to 80 percent of public officers' time
but consists of services that arguably do not require police academy training,
such as responding to burglary alarms, citing parking violations, and escorting
funeral processions. By privatizing this second group of services, police de-
partments may substantially reduce costs. The budgets of public police depart-
ments have increased at a rate of about 3 percent annually, while the demand
for police services is growing at a much faster rate.' 60 Eliminating many of
these general assistance functions can free up public officers to focus more on
fighting violent crime and fulfilling other responsibilities that require special
training.' 61 Many forces, including the quest for efficiency and effectiveness,
are driving the growing transfer or police power to private agencies.
Financial savings, increased effectiveness, and greater flexibility for po-
lice make privatization seem like a panacea. As we have seen, it is not. These
so-called benefits come at the cost of safety, accountability, and civil rights
protections because the actions of private police are not subject to the same
constitutional scrutiny as those of public police. The next Part of this Article
examines the history of cooperation between public and private police. Private
citizens and organizations have performed what are now considered public
police functions since before the United States was formed. This historical co-
operation supports calls to extend those remedies available for constitutional
violations by public police to similar violations by private police.
158. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America (UAW), Community Action Program, Issues II: Privatiza-
tion (2004), available at http://www.uaw.org/cap/04/issues/issuel2.cfm.
159. Id.
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IV. HISTORY OF COOPERATION BETWEEN
PRIVATE SECURITY AND LOCAL POLICE
Private security and full-time public police forces in the United States
were established at around the same time-the mid-1800s. Before that, the
town constable and sheriff played roles similar to the system of "watch and
ward" enacted in England after passage of the Statute of Westminster in
1621285. Sheriffs were paid by the number and type of offenders caught; con-
stables worked for the court to serve subpoenas and make arrests. 16 3 When
American public police forces were established in the mid-1800s, 164 the watch
and ward relied on community watchmen. 165 Even after public police forces
were established, private citizens continued to play a role in protecting both
persons and property. 166 Industrialization and the rapid growth of urban areas
brought a concomitant growth in crime that public departments had difficulty
containing. 167
The modem private security industry had its official beginnings in 1850,
when Allen Pinkerton formed Chicago's firSt private detective agency.168 Five
years later he formed the North West Police Agency, which provided security
for the railroad industry. 169 Two years later, Pinkerton created the Pinkerton
Protection Patrol that provided watchmen for a range of industrial clients. 70
Even in the early days of public police forces and emerging private security, the
United States govemment contracted with the private sector by hiring Pinkerton
"to provide intelligence gathering and VIP security for the military during the
Civil War.'
171
The twentieth century witnessed an increased need for a range of private
security services. 172 In the years before and during World War I, private secu-
rity expanded to protect factories and to help the govemment control espio-
162. The Statute of Westminster required that security forces be established in
every area of England to patrol against outlaws. Watch members were unpaid and all
able men were required to take turns on the security force. SIMONSEN, supra note 90,
at 14.
163. Brian Forst, The Privatization and Civilianization of Policing, in 2 CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 2000: BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 19, 27
(Nat'l Inst. of Justice, 2000).
164. SIMONSEN, supra note 90, at 14-15. The first public police force was estab-
lished in New York City in 1844. Id. at 15. Soon after, forces were established in
Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles and Philadelphia by 1856. Id.
165. Id. at 14-15.






172. Id. at 16.
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nage173 After the war and during the Depression, security declined greatly,
although the Burglary Protection Council was formed in 1921 to provide stan-
dards, testing, and certification of alarm systems.' 74 The private security indus-
try revived with World War II when government needed contractors to provide
security to protect defense plants from espionage and sabotage.' 75 After the
war, plant security continued and expanded from defense plants to other seg-
ments of the industrial sector.1 76 During the Cold War, private security contin-
ued to burgeon to meet the need for highly trained security personnel at defense
industry sites.
177
By the end of the nineteenth century, municipal police departments be-
came associated with corruption, including payoffs for selective non-
enforcement and for providing protection. 178 Public policing had expanded to
include a wide range of functions including sheltering the homeless, enforcing
sanitation laws, and inspecting fire escapes.' 79 From 1930 on, public policing
became more professionalized, with better screening and training of personnel
and restricting the function to crime control.' °
As public police began to be viewed as experts and professionals in
crime-fighting, they became distanced from the community. In many juris-
dictions police began spending less time patrolling the streets.1 82 The mission
of public police became further restricted to crime control, but ironically as the
public grew to mistrust their professionalism, their ability to effectively control
crime became limited.18 3 In the 1980s, researchers found that bringing the po-
lice closer to the community increased the public's satisfaction with policing
and had a positive effect on the public's perception of quality of life.184 At the
same time, the private sector's responses to dealing with crime reemerged as
pressure to control public expenditures has grown and public police have
reached their limits in dealing with crime. '
8 5




177. Id. at 17-18.
178. Forst, supra note 163, at 28.
179. Id. at 29.
180. Id. at 30.
181. Id. at 32.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 33 (citing ANTONY M. PATE ET AL., REDUCING FEAR OF CRIME IN
HOUSTON AND NEWARK: A SUMMARY REPORT (1986)).
185. Id. at 34.
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V. FROM "JUNIOR PARTNER" TO "EQUAL PARTNER"-
PRIVATE/PUBLIC COOPERATION'18 6
In 1971, the Department of Justice commissioned the RAND Corporation
to conduct an overview of private security in the United States. 1 7 The report
presented the growth of private security as due largely to a lack of resources for
public police. The RAND study put forth a "junior partner" theory, under
which private security primarily performed the prevention aspects of policing
and did not intrude on the more central functions of public policing.18 9
The National Institute of Justice funded another private security research
project in 1989 and 1990.190 Hallcrest Systems, Inc., was contracted to look at
the expansion and changes in private security over twenty years, to identify
trends in the private security industry and its relationships with public law en-
forcement, and to make recommendations aimed at promoting increased coop-
eration between the private and public sectors.' 9' The Hallcrest Report found
that, beginning in the mid-1980s, responsibility for protection had shifted from
public law enforcement to private security; it suggested a need for role-shifting
and increased cooperation between the public and private sectors.' 92 The Hall-
crest Report replaced the earlier "junior partner" theory with an "equal partner"
model:
Shift in Turf. A shift (measured in terms of spending and employ-
ment) in the primary responsibility for protection from public law
enforcement to private security has occurred. This shift suggests a
need for realignment of roles and greater cooperation between the
public and private sectors. The traditional approach by law enforce-
ment of working independently of citizens and businesses will
change. Greater coproduction of neighborhood (residential, business,
etc.) security by citizens, law enforcement, and private security will
occur as the members of various communities take a larger stake in
decision making about their protective options. 93
Indeed, private industry now performs functions traditionally performed
by police, such as alarm response, building and retail security, airport security,
186. 1 JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED
STATES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (United States Dep't of Justice ed., 1971).
187. 2 JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY:
ITS NATURE AND EXTENT (United States Dep't of Justice ed., 1971).
188. Id.
189. TREVOR JONES & TIM NEWBURN, PRIVATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICING
98(1998).
190. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7.
191. Id. at xiii.
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special events, public housing security, and prisoner transport.1 9 4 Cooperation
between the private sector and the police has been credited by many with a
decrease in crime, especially in urban centers.
Business Improvement Districts are one example of cooperative efforts to
improve public safety.' 95 In New York City, the Grand Central Partnership
works closely with city police to keep a 51 million square foot district patrolled
by private security guards. 196 Property owners in the district pay taxes to sup-
port this arrangement, which has reportedly resulted in a greater than fifty per-
cent decrease in reported crime.1 97 Some of the sixty security guards are armed,
others have "peace officer" status which in New York permits them to make
warrantless arrests and searches, unlike police officers, and to use deadly force
in arresting or preventing an escape. 198 In downtown St. Louis, a nearly twenty-
six percent decrease in crime was reported from 2002 to 2003 after the metro-
politan police department and a Downtown Community Improvement District
entered into a partnership, providing mounted and bicycle patrols.199
A program in Dallas, Texas, encourages cooperation between law en-
forcement and private security agencies, allowing the city police department to
call on security officers when needed.200 Programs include workshops by police
representatives in areas related to police procedures such as search and seizure,
petty theft and trespassing and privacy issues.20 1 In addition, private security
groups can communicate directly and regularly with Dallas police on a range of
issues.20 2 Workshops are offered for police officers describing such aspects of
203private security as licensing requirements and background checks.
194. See MARCIA CHAIKEN & JAN CHAIKEN, PUBLIC POLICING-PRIVATELY
PROVIDED app. D, at 43-44 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice ed., 1987). See also CUNNINGHAM
ET AL., supra note 7, at 247-81.
195. James Brooke, Police/Security Partnerships: Privatization Models that Im-
pact Crime, CRIME & JUSTICE INT'L, Apr./May 1996, available at http://158.135.23.2
1/cjcweb/college/cji/index.cfm?ID=206. See also David J. Kennedy, Note, Restrain-
ing the Power of Business Improvement Districts: The Case of Grand Central Part-
nership, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 283, 284-85 (1996).
196. Brooke, supra note 195.
197. Id. Property owners pay "an additional 12.5 cents per square foot" in taxes.
Id.
198. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 2.20(1)(a)-(c) (McKinney 2003).
199. St. Louis Metro Police Dep't Downtown St. Louis P'Ship, 4th District Police
Officer Awards and the Downtown St. Louis Safety Report 2003, at 3 (Mar. 31, 2004)
(on file with Missouri Law Review).
200. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATION
COOPERATION: GUIDELINES FOR PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2000).
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Contractual cooperation betweei the government and private security is
enormous. Approximately 36,000 of the estimated 1.1 million private security
personnel in 1985 were assigned to government contracts: 11,000 to the federal
government, 16,000 to local government, and 9,000 to state government. 204 A
residential community with no police force in North Barrington, Illinois, con-
tracted with a security company to provide emergency response, "loss preven-
tion," and "rule enforcement."20 5 While 5,000 federal police performed security
in government buildings in 1971, in 1996 the number shrank to a mere 409;
private security personnel comprised the remainder. 20 6 Over objections from
the American Federation of Government Employees, Congress has supported
this move to privatize police.20 7 Commanding officers of the New York City
Police Department and security directors in the city created the Area Police-
Private Security Liaison (APPL) in 1986.208 The goal was to enhance pub-
lic/private cooperation in the protection of people and property, to foster an
information exchange, and to diminish the credibility gap between police and
private security officers.
209
In joint investigations, public law enforcement officials have worked with
private businesses to conduct sting operations. The FBI worked with IBM in a
sting related to the sale of computer secrets, creating a bogus consulting firm
called Glenmar Associates. The sting resulted in the filing of criminal
charges against twenty-one people, and IBM filed suit against Hitachi and af-
filiated companies asking for damages for the alleged theft of trade secrets.
2 1
Defense attorneys in the case claimed that IBM had controlled the sting opera-
tion and that it was part of a business fight against international competition.2 12
The government would not provide documents requested by the defense to
assess its claim and, as a result, some charges against some defendants were
dropped.213
Attempting to deal with some of the issues raised by private security's
lack of accountability, the private sector often hires public police officers for
part-time work.2 14 However, even the procedures by which police obtain jobs
204. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7, at 276.
205. Id. at 278 (citing Private Security Takes to the Streets, SECURITY, Sept. 1989,
at 19).
206. Zielinski, supra note 7.
207. Id.
208. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 7, at 262.
209. Id.
210. Gary T. Marx, The Interweaving of Public and Private Police in Undercover




213. Id. Other such stings have existed between private security personnel work-
ing with the government Id. at 173-74.
214. Id. at 177-79.
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moonlighting in private security are not standardized. Although nearly one-
third of the half-million city police officers work part-time "detail work" in
private industry, the procedures governing part-time work vary among the es-
timated thirteen-thousand municipal police departments in the United States.
21 5
Despite the fact that only approximately 20 percent of police departments na-
tionwide prohibit detail work, nationally standardized procedures have not been
developed to protect police officers from on-the-job conflicts of interests, to
ensure that officers do not act under color of police authority while working for
private companies, and to establish consistent procedures for the use of police
vehicles, radios, and technology while on private detail work.2 16
In Fairfield, Connecticut, the Police Department is
authorized to have up to one hundred special police officers [under
the Special Services Division]. These officers work with ... regu-
lar police officers and assist... with . . . community policing ef-
forts. Special police officer[s] perform a wide range of functions
including: parking enforcement at beaches, railroad stations and
the center of Town; security at railroad stations and beaches;
community policing patrols in the downtown area; [and] traffic de-
tails as needed. Special police officers work part-time and their as-
signment can vary according to the needs of the Police Depart-
ment. They receive training in issuing parking tickets, traffic con-
215. Of the approximately 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States,
12,409 are municipal police agencies, 3,070 are sheriffs departments, 1,376 are spe-
cial police units with limited jurisdiction such as airports and parks, and 49 are state
police agencies. BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, CENSUS OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2000 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No.
NCJ 194066, Oct. 2002).
216. See Bowman v. Township of Pennsauken, 709 F. Supp. 1329 (D. N.J. 1989)
(city could not require police officer working off duty security jobs to obtain indem-
nity agreements from secondary employer for their acts as police officers); McNa-
mara v. City of Chicago, 700 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. I11. 1988) (civil rights suit allowed
for interfering with a police officer's secondary employment; political motivation
alleged); Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 759 P.2d 504
(Cal. 1988) (employer not restricted from adding further restrictions by statute prohib-
iting public employees from accepting off-duty employment that conflicts with their
public duties); Morton v. Bell, 452 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 1995) (off-duty police officers
could not use city vehicles while working at secondary employment); Fraternal Order
of Police, Local Lodge 73 v. City of Evansville, 559 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. 1990) (uphold-
ing police rule prohibiting secondary employment where alcoholic beverages are
consumed or sold); Lugo v. City of Newburgh, 618 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (upheld officer's termination who continued outside employment in violation
of direct prohibition imposed because of excessive sick leave).
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trol and other [areas], but they are not certified police officers.
Special police officers in Fairfield do not make arrests.
21 7
The increased cooperation between the public and private sectors has con-
tinued for nearly twenty years, as predicted in the Halicrest II report. The shift
in responsibility for protection from public law enforcement to private security
that Hallcrest researchers observed has indeed resulted in increased cooperation
between the public and private sectors, with the "equal partner" model arguably
ascendant.
A. Similarity and Blurring ofActivities
The "equal partner" theory espoused by Hallcrest researchers is evident in
all aspects of the private security industry and has, in fact, become customary
practice across the United States. Sharing personnel is one form of increased
cooperation that supports the equal partner model and blurs the line between the
private and public sectors. Private companies routinely hire off-duty police
officers and enter into cooperative investigations with the police. In so doing,
private companies benefit from the state police's ability to use weapons and to
gain access to otherwise protected information, while reducing their own liabil-
ity.218 The growth of public undercover police tactics has resulted in highly
experienced public law enforcement officials who bring their talents to the pri-
vate sector. 219 Many public police officers retire at comparatively young ages
or leave the public force to find employment in the private sector. 22 Some pri-
vate entities hire former public officers to conduct investigations because of
their ability to gain access to needed information.
22 1
Recently, the private sector has become increasingly interested in criminal
prosecution.222 It has cooperated with public law enforcement and benefits
from public resources in undercover operations in particular. In one joint ven-
ture, the State of Connecticut contributed money and two police officers to an
undercover operation focusing on insurance fraud.223 In another case, private
investigators prominently assisted in a Massachusetts arson case in which the
insurance agency paid handsomely to provide protective custody for the gov-
emnment's chief witness, to subsidize state employees' overtime, and to aug-
ment the Massachusetts attorney general's investigation. 224 Some of the private
217. Fairfield Police Dep't, Special Police, at http://www.fpdct.com/special_polic
e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
218. Marx, supra note 210, at 183.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 181.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 177.
223. Id. at 177-78.
224. Id. at 178.
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investigators worked as consultants to the state while others worked for the
insurance companies involved, but both worked in conjunction with the public
officials. 225 As a result, over thirty individuals were indicted.
226
Further blurring the line between the public and private sectors is the crea-
tion of joint entities, such as the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit that was
founded as a private organization for the sharing of intelligence files between
local and state police. 227 Its private nature allows an exchange of information
that would otherwise be prohibited for agents working purely in their public
capacity, and also avoids the privacy considerations that protect the collection
and sharing of such information. 228 Similarly, the New York Police Department
(NYPD) established a committee in 1985 to improve coordination with the
private security industry229 in sharing information about internal crimes, obser-
vations and crime trends, wanted persons, and recent patterns of crime.
230
In addition to the formation of joint agencies, government expenditures
support the proposition that "equal partnership" is customary: state and local
government spending on private security grew to $100 billion in 1987, up from
about $27 billion ten years earlier.231 The federal government spent nearly $2
billion in 1987.232 Los Angeles County alone had thirty-six contracts for private
security services in the early 1980s. 233 The similarity of activities, derived from
an expanded view of public policing that adds crime prevention and fear reduc-
tion to law enforcement, 234 contributes to the blurring of the line between pub-
lic and private policing.
Private security's status as "equal partner" with public law enforcement
necessitates the creation of minimum training standards. In the absence of legis-
lation requiring a basic level of education, litigators bringing cases against pri-




227. Id. at 179.
228. Id.
229. Forst, supra note 163, at 57.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 35 (citing WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., PRIVATE SECURITY:
PATTERNS AND TRENDS 2 (United States Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice eds.,
1991)).
232. Id. (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 231, at 2.).
233. Id. (citing E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT
183 (1987)).
234. Id. at 33.
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B. Intimidation by Appearance:
Implying State Sanctioned Use of Force
Perhaps the most distinct illustration of how intertwined public and pri-
vate police have become is the use of uniforms. A police officer's uniform is
one of the most easily recognized visual emblems signifying law enforcement.
It represents the power to arrest and the power to discipline.235 In fact, the po-
lice officer and uniform are such strong signifiers that the general public may
have difficulty distinguishing between law enforcement and the law itself.236
The mandate to use force lawfully has been called "the defining feature of
,237the role of police in society." As John Crew of the ACLU has explained,
The public gives the police unique powers to deprive us of our free-
dom and to use force. The uniform and badge are the visual symbols
of those powers. Those symbols shouldn't be displayed unless police
officers are on duty and using those powers for all, not just on behalf
of those able to pay.
238
Nevertheless, the private police industry relies on uniforms to imbue its
agents with the public police's implied monopoly on state-sanctioned use of
force and coercion. It is customary for private security personnel to wear guard
uniforms that are often indistinguishable from public police uniforms. As a
result, private security personnel are frequently mistaken for public police. In
some jurisdictions, public police officers moonlighting on private detail are
allowed to wear their public uniforms, and the public perceives them to be act-
ing in their official, public capacity. Moreover, the laws in most states support
that assumption: if a moonlighting officer witnesses a violent crime he must
then act in his public capacity and intervene.
The power to intimidate that a police uniform carries with it, especially
when accompanied by a weapon, is well known in Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. Officers in uniform often signify to individuals, rightly or wrongly,
that they do not have the right to refuse a search.
While private police do not possess the same powers as public police,
most individuals stopped by a uniformed security guard assume that the guard
235. ALAN COFFEY ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND PROCESS 43 (1974).
236. Id. at 42.
237. Karen L. Amendola, Office Behavior in Police-Citizen Encounter: A De-
scriptive Model and Implications for Less-Than-Lethal Alternatives, POLICE FOUND.
REp. (Sept. 1996), available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf'officerbehavior.pdf
238. Stuchinsky, supra note 71 (quoting John Crew, Director of the Police Prac-
tices Project of the ACLU of Northern California).
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possesses legal authority to search and seize. 2 39 In fact, the Private-Sector Liai-
son Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police acknowl-
edges that "private security personnel... [are placed] in a wide range of posi-
tions which call for the use of authority on the property they protect." 240 This
confusion about the law affords private police an additional advantage over
private citizens making citizens' arrests.
241
The wearing of uniforms, badges, and sometimes guns-all of which are
at first glance nearly identical to those of the public police-amounts to "in-
timidation by appearance. ' 242 "Police associations have been critical of this
tendency, arguing that citizens [frequently believe that] they are dealing with a
police officer when a security guard approaches them." 243 But many private
security executives argue that their officers should resemble public police and
need handcuffs and weapons because they are performing active policing just
like public officers.
244
The police uniform is so clearly identified with "the job" that proposed
changes to uniform garb have provoked strong reaction from public police for
the last four decades. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, police departments
across the country experimented with changing police uniforms in an effort to
improve public perception of the police. But as C.D. Cochran and Ronald
Wiley have noted, "The proposal to change the traditional police uniform pro-
239. There is a dearth of empirical evidence of the effect of uniforms on public
perception. P. N. Hamid has written that early on in life we learn that differences exist
among people based on the clothing they wear:
Such distinctions enable the child to identify men, women, policemen,
firemen, soldiers, nurses, etc., with speed and reliability. Dress, therefore,
provides an efficient cue for the classification of others. Thus, just as emo-
tion can be attributed to certain facial expressions, so too actions and ac-
tivities can be attributed to persons in different modes of dress.
Paul N. Hamid, Changes in Person Perception as a Function of Dress, 29
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 191, 191 (1969).
240. INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 26, at 4.
241. Rick Sarre, The Legal Basis for the Authority of Private Police and an Ex-
amination of Their Relationship with the "Public" Police, 23 AIC Conference Pro-
ceedings, in PRIVATE SECTOR AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 167, 168 (Australian Inst. of Criminology Conference Proceedings
No. 23, 1994), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/ 2 3 /Sarre
.pdf (citing Thomas M. Scott & Marlys McPherson, The Development of the Private
Sector of the Criminal Justice System, 6 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 267, 272 (1971)).
242. Id. at 172.
243. LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, IN SEARCH OF SECURITY: THE ROLES OF
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duces highly emotional responses and it seems to touch on some very basic
motivations and attitudes of police officers." 245
As any other private actor, private security guards have limited rights to
make citizens' arrests when they believe that a crime is being committed on
private property. People may believe that private police have the same authority
as public police because of the uniform and trappings of police power, but they
are mistaken. The poor screening, training, and supervision of private security
forces makes this a dangerous mistake. Moreover, it is a mistake that has been
fostered by the government's failure to regulate the private security industry,
while increasingly relying on it at the same time.
Widespread misperception of private officers' authority may subject indi-
viduals to a risk of harm. The public expects the government to protect its citi-
zens and ensure that their rights are not violated. Because the state must not put
its citizens at risk through public policing, it should not subject individuals to
the risk of harm posed by state-contracted private security services. In addition,
because of the special powers of the police to arrest, use force, and conduct
searches and seizures, a system of checks must be established to minimize the
use of police powers.
246
The government has not acted to impose any standards guiding private se-
curity's power to search and seize despite having effectively given this power
over to private security agencies through extensive contractual arrangements.
By cooperating with an industry plagued by insufficient training, poorly quali-
fied or even dangerous personnel, and a virtual lack of standards, the state cre-
ates an unreasonable risk of injury to the public.
VI. SECTION 1983 LITIGATION FOR INSTITUTIONALIZED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS OF PRIVATE POLICE:
CUSTOM AND PRACTICE
As argued in Part IV, the interchangeability of the private and public sec-
tors in performing the full panoply of police-related activities precludes a ra-
tional division between state-sanctioned action, on the one hand, and private
action completely free from governmental direction on the other. At the same
time, as shown in Part I, the private security industry is plagued by incompe-
tence and conflicts of interest. This raises the question: what protects the citi-
zenry from harmful actions by private police?
The constitutional protections covering actions by government police are
largely inapplicable to private police. However, the government may be held
liable for the harmful actions of private actors when the government conspires
245. Ronald E. Wiley & C.D. Cochran, Blazers: A National Survey of Attitudes,
POLICE CHIEF, July 1972, at 68.
246. DAVID L. CARTER & Louis A. RADELET, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY
99 (6th ed. 1999).
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with the private actor to cause the harm, 247 or where the government has a spe-
cial relationship with the victim.
248
Most of the constitutional rights of individuals are protected only against
governmental intrusion, or "state action. ' 249 But in some cases, actions by pri-
vate individuals, or a group of individuals, may be considered state action sub-
ject to constitutional restraints. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 (the Civil Rights Act of
1871), plaintiffs may seek a remedy for deprivations of constitutional or federal
statutory rights resulting from authorized as well as unauthorized actions of
state officials or private citizens acting "under color of law."250 In order to es-
tablish a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show (1) a deprivation of a fed-
eral constitutional or statutory right 251 (2) by a person or entity acting under
color of state law. 252 In the usual case, the plaintiff must prove that a state gov-
emmental entity or officer has deprived her of a right protected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or by federal statute. Entities acting under color of
state law are generally one of the following: a municipality, municipal agency
or department, state agency or other entity, and its employees charged with
exercising state powers.
253
However, private defendants may also act under color of law. Liability
may attach in certain instances when a private entity works in conjunction or in
254 255
conspiracy with a governmental official.254 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
the Supreme Court allowed a Section 1983 action against a private actor who
seized the plaintiff's property in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.256 The Court found that even a private defendant is acting
"under color of law" if his actions constitute state action under the Fourteenth
247. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
248. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
249. A notable exception is the Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits any form
of slavery or involuntary servitude, whether public or private.
250. See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION §§
1:1-1:2 (3d ed. 2003).
251. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (initial inquiry under any Sec-
tion 1983 suit is whether plaintiff has been deprived of constitutional right).
252. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
253. Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
254. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
255. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
256. For deprivations of rights secured (or incorporated) by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the plaintiff must also show state action. Id. at 924.
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Amendment. 257 The Lugar Court spelled out an approach for determining if
private conduct depriving an individual of her constitutional rights was attribut-
able to the state:
the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State .... [and] the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has
acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state offi-
cials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State.25 8
Security guards and police officers working for private entities, licensed
as special police officers and granted police powers, may be found to be acting
under color of law.259 However, some courts have ruled that special police
status alone does not establish color of law and that the imposition of liability
depends on whether the officers were performing a "public function"--one
traditionally performed for the public good by the state. The Supreme Court has
been clear that the scope of public functions is limited, reaching only activities
that have been "'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."' 260 The
257. Id. at 935. It should be noted that "state action" and action "under color of
law" are not completely identical: while all state action occurs under color of law, not
all action under color of law will qualify as state action. Id. at 935 n. 18. Several doc-
trinal variations exist for determining if private actions constitute "state action." Es-
sentially, these tests are theoretical and have provided little practical assistance in
holding private security guards accountable. The Supreme Court's record in finding
no state action in such cases has been consistent and clear-it repeatedly distinguishes
precedent in order to avoid finding state action on the part of private actors. See Jody
Freeman, Private Role in Public Governance, N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 576 (2000). The
nexus test, symbiotic relationship test, joint action test, state compulsion test, state
involvement test, joint participation test, and public function test have only rarely
resulted in the Supreme Court holding private officers liable under Section 1983. See
LYNNE WILSON, PRIVATE POLICE VIOLENCE AND THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1983, at 27-
28 (Nat'l Police Accountability Project, Research Paper), available at http://www.nlg
.org/npap/research_papers/LWprivatepolice.wpd (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27-28 (1980) (private officers liable if "willful participant in a joint action with
the state or its agents") and Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1977) (fireman
willing participant and acting in concert with police)).
258. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
259. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Thompson v. McCoy,
425 F. Supp. 407 (D. S.C. 1976); AVERY ET AL., supra note 250, § 1:2.
260. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quoting Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978). In Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, a warehouseman had a lien on
goods stored with him to cover unpaid storage charges. Id. at 153. He sold the goods
and the owner claimed that due process was required because the resolution of dis-
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Court has found two functions are exclusively governmental: running elec-
tions261 and running a town.262 The Court has not established what constitutes
"traditional exclusivity" with respect to police protection, although some opin-
ions recognize police activities as exclusively a state function.
263
A private defendant, "jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged
action, [is] acting 'under color' of law." 264 The Supreme Court held in Dennis
26
v. Sparks265 that the proper test for determining whether a private party is liable
under Section 1983 is whether the party was "a willful participant in joint ac-
tion with the State or its agents." 266 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,267 the Court
held that the involvement of a policeman in an alleged conspiracy provided the
necessary state action to prove a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights
268
entitling the petitioner to relief under Section 1983. In Adickes, the Court
reasoned that if the state compels the performance of unconstitutional practices,
the fact that the practice is carried out by a private actor rather than a public
actor should not preclude liability.
269
putes is a "public function." Id. at 157-58. The Court held that "the settlement of
disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public func-
tion." Id. at 161. Justice Rehnquist mentioned "education, fire and police protection,
and tax collection" as being traditionally exclusive, but did not write whether gov-
ernment might delegate performance of such functions to private entities and thus
avoid Fourteenth Amendment restrictions. Id. at 163-64.
In Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a volunteer fire company was not performing an exclu-
sive government function for two reasons: (1) state law in Texas did not compel the
city to establish a fire department, even though it allowed it; and (2) fire fighting is
not generally an exclusive government function due to the existence of a variety of
private sector fire fighting alternatives. Id. at 340-41.
261. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 268 U.S. 73 (1932).
262. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
263. Gimore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974).
264. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). The court in Murray v. Wal-
Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1989), found that store security guards acted under
color of law. Id. at 558-59. The store manager testified that the store's practice was to
work with police in prosecuting shoplifters-guards notified and asked for assistance
from police, the guards were also police department employees and state law permit-
ted merchants to detain suspected shoplifters for a reasonable period of time. Id. at
559.
265. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
266. Id. at 27.
267. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
268. Id. at 150-52.
269. Id. at 170-71.
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A. Equitable Relieffor Unconstitutional Customs and Practices
An important means of addressing civil rights abuses is to bring "custom
or practice" claims against municipalities. In municipalities where police de-
partments cooperate with private police, custom-or-practice suits are an espe-
cially effective way to try to limit future harms. Under Monell v. Department of
Social Services,2 70 municipalities may be held liable for customs, practices, or
policies that repeatedly place police officers in situations that may violate the
constitutional rights of citizens. Such lawsuits, also known as "pattern and prac-
tice" suits, have been successful in holding municipalities accountable for poor
policies and requiring the policies be changed.
Custom is defined as a "widespread practice that, although not authorized
by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as
to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law," 271 even absent formal
written policy or absent official policymakers' actual knowledge of the prac-
tice:
"[The] 'custom and usage' [in question will] be attributed to a municipal-
ity when the duration and frequency of the practices warrants a finding of
either actual or constructive knowledge by the ... governing body [or
policymaker with responsibility for oversight and supervision] that the
practices have become customary among its employees...."272
Constructive changes frequently occur when government agencies are
forced to defend their policies in court. Affirmative litigation not only results in
judgments holding certain practices unconstitutional, but also serves to raise
public awareness of such unlawful police activities. Examples of laws govern-
ing police department policy held unlawful include a Tennessee statute allow-
ing police officers to fire their weapons at individuals fleeing from police,
whether or not a threat was posed.273 Another example is failure to train police
274officers. In City of Canton v. Harris, the Court found that a municipality
must be deliberately indifferent to the rights of individuals coming into contact
with its officers in order to be liable. 275 The Court held that deliberate indiffer-
ence may be evinced by failure to train employees to handle recurring situations
with constitutional implications when that failure actually results in a violation
of civil rights. 276 Failure to train may also be found when a municipality does
270. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
271. McTigue v. Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
272. AVERY ET AL., supra note 250, § 4:19 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d
1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987)).
273. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985).
274. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
275. Id. at 388-89.
276. Id. at 390.
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not provide additional training after learning of a pattern of unconstitutional
police practices.
277
Municipal liability has been found in several kinds of practices involving
public police cooperation with private entities performing law enforcement-
type activities. An unconstitutional custom was found when private parties
hired police officers to accompany them in serving process in civil actions and
to stay on the premises while the private actors carried out seizures. 278 Munici-
pal liability was also found in a policy allowing police to arrest individuals,
without conducting any additional investigation, solely on the word of mer-
chants who suspected them of shoplifting.279 Another policy involving pub-
lic/private cooperation permitted private clubs to essentially act as law en-
forcement, resulting in a suspect being beaten to death while in the custody of a
bar owner.
280
As litigation against private security companies increases, the complexi-
ties of private/public police cooperation may give rise to pattern and practice
lawsuits against private security companies. In order to effect systemic im-
provements to the private security industry and to the manner in which public
and private police cooperate, litigators should seek declaratory and equitable
relief, in addition to monetary damages, in pattern and practice cases. Equitable
remedies should seek to address the underlying problem. The relief sought can
include improved mandatory training, better screening and hiring practices, and
improved supervision for private security personnel. If requests for equitable
relief--either injunctions or declaratory judgments-become common practice,
over time the private security industry may take responsibility, either through
compliance with court orders or as a means of avoiding further litigation, for
improving training, hiring, and supervision of all personnel who have direct
contact with the public. Equitable relief is especially appropriate when there is a
threat of continuing conduct that violates citizens' rights. When a practice or
custom of police exists and poses a threat of future injury, a request for an in-
junction or declaratory judgment should be made a standard part of the com-
plaint. 28
1
Courts have imposed equitable relief on cities whose police departments
systematically engage in unconstitutional patterns and practices. In 1994 Con-
gress gave the federal government the authority to investigate cities or towns
whose police forces were exceeding or abusing their authority. With passage of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral may file a federal lawsuit aimed at ending unconstitutional police patterns
277. Id. at 390 n.10.
278. Open Inns, Ltd. v. Chester County Sheriff's Dep't, 24 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429-
30 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
279. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc. 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated by
474 U.S. 805 (1985).
280. Horton v. Charles, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).
281. AVERY ETAL., supra note 250, § 15:1.
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and practices.282 The Act included a provision under which the Department of
Justice can sue for declaratory and equitable relief if any governmental author-
ity or person acting on behalf of any governmental authority "engage[s] in a
pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers ... that deprives
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States."
283
Pattern and practice lawsuits, as well as consent decrees (judicial orders
spelling out the terms of an agreement between parties), are considered an es-
sential part of effecting large-scale institutional reform in police departments.
Former U.S. Assistant Attorney General John Dunne, for example, is on record
as supporting pattern and practice suits, noting that consent decrees are an ef-
fective means of forcing high-level police officials to make a commitment to
reform.284 Human Rights Watch, in its report Shielded from Justice: Police
Brutality and Accountability in the United States,285 and in a letter to the De-
partment of Justice, called pattern and practice suits "essential tools to improve
police behavior and oversight."
286
In 1996 the Department of Justice in fact initiated several such federal pat-
tern and practice investigations of police departments which resulted in agree-
282. Section 210401 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, reads:
Sec. 210401. CAUSE OF ACTION.
(a) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.-It shall be unlawful for any governmen-
tal authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a gov-
ernmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law
enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
(b) CIVIL ACTION BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.-Whenever the At-
torney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of para-
graph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the
United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and de-
claratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.
H.R. 3355, 103rd Cong. (1994).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).
284. ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS & HEATHER WARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTING POLICE MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CIVIL
RIGHTS DIVISION 17 (1998).
285. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (July 1998).
286. Id. Letter from Human Rights Watch to Assistant Attorney General Bill Lann
Lee (Feb. 14, 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/03/nyr314.htm.
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ments with local police departments around the country.287 The first such con-
sent decree was with the City of Pittsburgh, which had been plagued by a great
mistrust of police, especially within the black community, since the 1960s.
In the 1990s, mistrust of Pittsburgh police was fueled by several high-
profile incidents of police misconduct.288 In 1995, police killed two black men
in custody.289 In another incident, police fired fifty-one bullets into a civilian,
killing him. 29° Yet another man was stopped by police while driving in the sub-
urbs and was then beaten and suffocated by the officers. 29 1 These incidents
occurred during a period of internal changes within the police department.
292
From 1994-1995, then Mayor Sophie Masloff created incentives for older offi-
293cers to retire. Vacancies were filled by mostly young, inexperienced white
male officers, leaving very few veteran officers to supervise. 294 Adding to this,
in 1991 the mayor had slashed the budget of the investigatory office for police
accountability and filled vacancies with police officers rather than civilians. 295
The United States Justice Department's Civil Rights Division looked into
allegations of systemic police misconduct in Pittsburgh and negotiated a five-
year consent decree, instituting reforms aimed at curbing violative practices.296
A federal judge lifted most of the oversight impositions in 2002 with the excep-
tion of those governing the Office of Municipal Investigation that looks into
allegations of police misconduct.297 The City acknowledged that the Office
needed to clear a backlog of cases and agreed to clear the backlog, not allow
another backlog to develop, and maintain a computerized database to track
claims of misconduct and investigations. 298 In addition, the City agreed to re-port monthly to a court-appointed auditor and to ensure that open case files
287. HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, THE ASSAULT ON FREE SPEECH, PUBLIC ASSEMBLY, AND
DISSENT: A NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD REPORT ON GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2004).
288. ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TURNING NECESSITY
INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH'S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 3-8
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/1 80_326.pdf.




293. Id. at 3-4.
294. Id. at 4.
295. Id. at 5.
296. Id. at 7-8; United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16,
1997) (consent decree), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htrn.
297. Torsten Ove, Judge Lifts U.S. Oversight of City of Pittsburgh Police,
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contain adequate information for the auditor to determine if the Office is in
compliance with the consent decree.299
In 1995, an investigation of police misconduct in Philadelphia's 39th Dis-
trict revealed startling evidence that police officers routinely lied while testify-
ing in court. 300 Six officers were convicted and 160 criminal convictions were
overturned. 301 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP), the Police-Barrio Relations Unit, and the American Civil Liber-
ties Union of Philadelphia threatened to bring a class action alleging that the
City of Philadelphia condoned systemic police practices of violating the civil
rights of citizens. 31 2 In 1996, the City entered into a settlement calling for a
system of reforms aimed at ensuring that complaints against police would be
properly investigated; the creation of an Integrity and Accountability Office
was part of a system of reforms aimed at reducing police misconduct. 303
The 1996 settlement of NAACP v. City of Philadelphia30 4 resulted in an
agreement allowing the ACLU to monitor internal records to determine the
Philadelphia Police Department's progress in implementing systemic re-
forms. 30 5 As of 2000, the lawyers completed four reports analyzing pedestrian
and car stops as well as internal affairs and narcotics investigations. 30 6 A
change in police reporting systems was negotiated in response to reports on
racially discriminatory law enforcement stops. 30 7 In their fifth annual report,
however, the monitors noted that the department failed to cure the illegal stop-
ping of pedestrians and drivers without reasonable suspicion and the illegal
targeting of African-Americans.
308
In 1999, a federal class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of all African-
American residents of Hobbs, New Mexico, alleging a pattern and practice of
unlawful searches and seizures, physical abuse, and harassment by the Hobbs
Police Department. 309 Two years after the suit was filed, the City of Hobbs
299. Id.
300. Gwen Shaffer, Internal Affairs, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Jan. 8-15, 1998,
available at http://citypaper.net/articles/010898/cov.cops.shtml.
301. Id.
302. Carlton L. Johnson, Philadelphia Law Department Civil Rights Unit Serves
as National Model, PHILLY SOLICITOR (Office of The City Solicitor, Philadelphia, Pa.,
Vol. 2, Issue 1).
303. Shaffer, supra note 300.
304. NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV-96-6045 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 4,
1996).
305. Shannon P. Duffy, Police Monitors: Race Still a Factor in Improper Stops,
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approved a stipulated class action agreement pledging to improve police prac-
tices. 31 The agreement requires the police department to improve its internal
reporting procedures, racial data collections, investigation of officer misconduct
and training and discipline, as well as improve its procedures regarding
searches, seizures, arrests, detentions, and the use of force. 3 1 1 Police officers
will receive a minimum of forty hours of in-service training in the areas of use
of force, integrity, ethics, and cultural diversity.3 12 An independent moni-
tor/mediator, UCLA Police Chief Clarence Chapman, will ensure that the stipu-
lated agreement is implemented for a three-year period.313 He is mandated to
review statistical data, citizen complaints, and reports and make recommenda-
tions about remedial measures needed to address any problems raised in com-
plaints and reports.
314
In Daniels v. City of New York,3t5 a class action under Section 1983
against the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the plaintiffs asked for
an injunction barring the NYPD's Street Crime Unit (SCU) from its policy,
practice, and custom of unconstitutionally stopping and frisking individuals
based on their race and/or national origin without reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.3 16 In 1994, then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and then-Police
Commissioner William Bratton directed the SCU-whose slogan was "We
Own the Night,"-to launch an aggressive campaign to rid the streets of illegal
weapons. 317 The Unit focused on stopping and frisking residents of lower-
income neighborhoods, resulting in allegations of minority harassment. 318 The
SCU gained national attention in 1999, when four of its white officers fired
nineteen bullets into Amadou Diallo, who was unarmed.3 19 In addition to dam-
ages, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the practice unconstitutional and
also sought a court order eliminating the SCU or barring it from making any
more improper stop-and-fisks. 3
20
310. Stipulated Agreement at 2-3, Johnson (No. CIV 99-348).
311. Id. at 27-28.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. On February 12, 2003, lawyers with the American Civil Liberties Union of
New Mexico filed the third and final motion against the City of Hobbs and its Police
Department for non-compliance with the stipulated agreement. Press Release, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Takes Action Against Hobbs Police Department for
Repeated Violations of Negotiated Agreement (Feb. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu-nm.org/news-press-2003-02-12.htm.
315. 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (mem.).
316. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
317. TIMOTHY LYNCH, "WE OWN THE NIGHT:" AMADOU DIALLO's DEADLY
ENCOUNTER WITH NEW YORK CITY'S STREET CRIMES UNIT 4-5 (Cato Inst. Briefing
Paper No. 56, Mar. 31, 2000).
318. Id. at 3.
319. Id. at 6.
320. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409,412 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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While the case was still in progress, the NYPD disbanded the Street
Crimes Unit. 32 1 In 2003, a settlement was reached incorporating the order pro-
hibiting racial profiling by the NYPD and making it legally binding on all New
York City police officers.322 The settlement also included a requirement that the
NYPD audit officers and supervisors who conduct stop-and-frisks to determine
if they are based on reasonable suspicion and if they are being documented.323
Audit results are to be given to plaintiffs' counsel.324 An independent auditor
will conduct a quarterly review of all stop-and-frisks to monitor for compli-
ance.
3 25
The strategy employed in these public police cases may also be used to
limit municipal police forces' reliance on private security forces, and to impose
more stringent standards for the selection, training, and oversight of private
security forces on whom municipalities now rely. As the preceding discussion
suggests, requests for equitable relief against private security forces would be
most likely to succeed where the municipality has a custom of reliance on and
cooperation with the private security force.
B. Sample for Seeking Equitable Relief:
Proposed Standards for Selection, Training,
and Licensing of Private Security Officers
There are several models of training guidelines for litigators to modify or
borrow from when seeking equitable relief in the form of mandated training for
private police. In 2001, ASIS International, an organization for security profes-
sionals worldwide, formed the ASIS International Commission on Guidelines
to respond to the need for security guidelines in the United States.326 In October
2003, the ASIS Commission on Guidelines approved a draft of private security
321. The street crime unit was dismantled on April 9, 2002. Alice McQuillan,
Street Crime Unit Axed: Mayor Says Teams' Demise Not Diallo-linked, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.nyfinestsnews.com/streetcrimel.html.
Following the fatal shooting of Amadou Diallo in 1999, the street crime unit lost most
of its autonomy as it underwent several reorganizations. Id. In 1999, the unit was
divided into eight parts. Id. With the 2002 disbanding, most of the unit's officers were
transferred to plainclothes anti-crime teams or precinct detective squads. Id.
322. Stipulation Agreement at 5 & exhibit A, Daniels (No. 99 Civ. 1695).
323. Id. at 5-6.
324. Id. at 6.
325. Id.
326. ASIS International, Guidelines, available at http://www.asisonline.org/guidelin
es/guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). ASIS had participated in the Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals in 1976. See ASIS INT'L, ASIS COMM'N ON GUIDELINES,
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officer selection and training guidelines. 327 Recommendations for training in-
clude a requirement that each private security officer receive forty-eight hours
of training for the first one-hundred days of work, broken into eight pre-
assignment, sixteen post-assignment and twenty-four additional post-
assignment. 32 Thirty-four training topics are listed, ranging from blood-bome
pathogens, laws of evidence, and use of force and force continuum, to diversity
in the workplace, customer service, and public relations. 329
An earlier set of guidelines for standardizing private security officer selec-
tion, training, and licensing was developed by the Private-Sector Liaison
Committee, with representatives of the National Sheriffs' Association, the Na-
tional Association of Security Companies, the National Association of Security
and Investigator Regulators, and the American Society for Industrial Secu-
rity.330
The Private-Sector Liaison Committee guidelines call for screening out
anyone convicted of, or who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in
any jurisdiction. 331 This is based on the likelihood that security officers may be
in contact with active crime scenes.332 Also screened is anyone who has been
convicted of, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to, "a misdemeanor involv-
ing moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty or acts against govemmental authority,
including the use and/or possession of a controlled substance" in the past seven
years; and "to any crime in any jurisdiction involving the sale, delivery, or
manufacture of a controlled substance." 333
The guidelines also recommend that candidates should not have been
"[d]eclared by any court to be incompetent by reason of mental disease or de-
fect." 334 Applicants for security guard positions must submit two sets of finger-
prints and a statement of conviction of crimes for a state criminal record check
and an FBI criminal history check.335 The candidates must supply prior em-
ployment history.336 The employer should make a reasonable attempt to verify
the past seven years of employment history and check three personal refer-
ences. 337 Applicants must pass a drug screen and unarmed guards must be at
least eighteen years of age; armed security officers must be at least twenty-one
years-old.338
327. Id. at 1.
328. Id. at 11.
329. Id.
330. Thomas Seamon, IACP's Private Sector Liaison Committee: Partners in
Public Safety, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (June 1999), at 17.
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The Private-Sector Liaison Committee recommends three classifications for
licensing and certification. 339 They divide into Class I for Security Officer and
Unarmed Alarm Responder, Class II for Armed Security Officer/Armed Alarm
Responder, and Class III for Armored Car Security Officer.340 The guidelines
provide for temporary security officer permits that may be issued to individuals
meeting the qualifications and selection criteria if the employer has provided the
state licensing board with the required application for a registration permit.
341
Employers must also include a "statement from a certified trainer [acknowledg-
ing] completion of [all] pre-assignment training requirements."
342
Individuals applying for class II and III licenses or certification must be at
least 21 years old, must "[s]ubmit a statement by a state-recognized firearms in-
structor verifying that the firearms training and range qualification requirements
of these guidelines have been" met, and must also pass annual range qualification
tests certified by a state-recognized firearms instructor.343 Licenses should be
renewed every two years and regulators should conduct state and national checks
again at the time of license renewals.
344
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement and the private security industry are intimate partners in
nearly all facets of police services in the United States. Virtually indistinguishable
from municipal police in certain instances, improperly trained and supervised
private security guards performing public policing functions frequently expose
the public to a risk of harm. Traditional tests to find state action and hold private
actors accountable for constitutional violations are ill-defined and usually fail in
private police cases. By virtue of similarity of function and activities, and of pri-
vate officers' availing themselves of the vestiges of police uniforms, badges, and
even weapons--each of which contributes to the implied state-sanctioned use of
coercion and force-security personnel and private contractors should be subject
to training as thorough and rigorous as that of public police.
As the private security industry continues to grow, and the dependency of
law enforcement on privatized functions increases, litigation against private secu-
rity companies will continue. When bringing lawsuits against private security
companies, litigators should seek equitable relief in the form of improved manda-
tory training for private security personnel. If requests for equitable relief become
common practice, over time the private security industry may take responsibility
for improving training, hiring, and supervision of all personnel who have direct
contact with the public.
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